Removing the Mask of Nationality: Unionism, Racism, and Federal Military Occupation in North Carolina, 1862–1865

By Judkin Browning

As dawn cast its shimmering light over the sleepy little port of Beaufort, North Carolina, on the soggy morning of March 26, 1862, local residents awoke to find their world had changed overnight. They had drifted off to sleep the night before as residents of a quiet Confederate municipality but awakened to find themselves inhabitants of the newest Federal outpost in North America. An expedition under the command of General Ambrose E. Burnside had captured Roanoke Island in February and New Bern on March 14, before advancing on Beaufort and Fort Macon, which guarded Beaufort’s harbor. During the wet, foggy night of March 25, two companies from the Fourth Rhode Island regiment shoved off from Morehead City, quietly rowed past Fort Macon, landed at Beaufort’s wharf, and marched into this county seat of Carteret County on the southern tip of the Outer Banks, marking the beginning of a Union occupation that would last the rest of the war.¹

¹ John G. Parke to Ambrose Burnside, March 26, 1862, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (70 vols. in 128; Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), Ser. I, Vol. IX, 278-80; hereinafter cited as Official Records; Undated entry [before April 23, 1862], James Rumley Diary, Levi Woodbury Pigott Collection (North Carolina State Archives, North Carolina Office of Archives and History, Raleigh; hereinafter cited as NCSA). The identification of the diarist as James Rumley, not Levi Pigott, was made in August 2000 and is not reflected in all finding aids. George H. Allen remembered the date incorrectly as March 21 when he wrote his regimental history twenty-five years after the fact. The two contemporaneous sources, Parke and Rumley, confirm that Beaufort was occupied on March 25, 1862. George H. Allen, Forty-Six Months with the Fourth R.I. Volunteers, in the War of 1861 to 1865 . . . (Providence, 1887), 101. For their comments on earlier versions of this essay, I wish to thank John C. Inscoe, Thomas G. Dyer, and the anonymous readers for the Journal of Southern History. A version of this essay was presented at the sixty-ninth annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association, where it won the William F. Holmes Award. I would like to thank the panel’s commentator, Robert C. Kenzer, chairperson Jane Turner Censer, and the Holmes Award

Mr. Browning is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Georgia.
President Abraham Lincoln and many Federal authorities anticipated that the majority of local white citizens would be loyal, and they expected to utilize this sentiment to foster a harmonious reconstruction. Lincoln believed that a show of force and benevolence by the Union army would bring thousands back to the Union fold. Thus, the initial Union policy throughout the South was one of conciliation, and the early experience along North Carolina's coast was no different. Lincoln even appointed a native son, Edward Stanly, as military governor of the state in May 1862 to help reconstitute local self-government and reassure the local population of the national government's limited war aims of restoring the Union. Early results seemed positive; indeed, the people of Carteret appeared to be the grateful Unionists whom Lincoln envisioned. Residents, seeking to take advantage of new economic opportunities while simultaneously maintaining the social status quo, wedded themselves to the Union. Yet, just a few months into the honeymoon, many apparent Unionists rejected their occupiers, primarily over perceived arbitrary uses of Federal power and serious disagreements over racial policies. Contrary to Lincoln's optimism, the experience of Union occupation would ultimately drive local residents more firmly into the Confederate camp than they otherwise would have been.

Many scholars have shown that Lincoln too readily placed a firm faith in southern Unionism. William C. Harris argues that Lincoln "consistently overestimated" Unionist strength during the war, while he "conversely . . . underestimated the support of the Southern people for the rebellion." Stephen V. Ash points out that not only Lincoln but also most northerners believed that "a large proportion of the Confederacy's citizens were loyal Unionists subjugated and silenced by the Rebel despots . . . ." William Blair argues that the problem was that northerners misunderstood the benign actions of many southern citizens; in Blair's words, northerners "confused acquiescence with loyalty." Hence, the standard scholarly argument asserts that in late 1862 when northern soldiers occupying the South realized their error,
they shifted from a policy of conciliation toward one of a much harsher
tone in reaction to surprisingly inveterate southern hostility.3

While scholars may agree that Union soldiers figuratively took off
their kid gloves and displayed “the hard hand of war” in reaction to
southern hostility, in eastern North Carolina the hostility of white
southerners (including Unionists) was a reaction to a Federal occupa-
tion that they perceived as oppressive, callous, and radical, especially
in terms of race. In the wake of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation,
local whites realized that what had been a limited war to restore the
Union had become a sweeping, society-changing war, much like se-
cessionist fire-eaters had predicted. This serious disagreement over the
nature of Union war policy simply lit the fuse of discontent. Even a
staunch Unionist like Tennessee’s William G. “Parson” Brownlow
admitted that if the loyal Union men in the border states ever felt that
Lincoln “contemplated the subjugation of the South or the abolishing
of slavery, there would not be a Union man among us in twenty-four
hours.” In Carteret County, local whites similarly demonstrated that
race was more important than economic interests. The wartime expe-
rience of this community informs us why Reconstruction would be so
difficult; no matter what economic enticements were proffered, south-
ern whites would not be satisfied until they established racial control.4

The Carteret region offers a powerful lens through which to view
several larger issues of the Civil War. While concentrating on aspects
specific to the occupation of Beaufort and New Bern, this article also
places that experience in the context of other areas of occupation in
the American South. Though Carteret County was certainly distinc-
tive—it was a low-slaveholding, coastal, Whig community that had

3 William C. Harris, With Charity for All: Lincoln and the Restoration of the Union
(Lexington, Ky., 1997), 8; Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the
Occupied South, 1861–1865 (Chapel Hill, 1995), 26; and William Blair, Virginia’s Private War:
Feeding Body and Soul in the Confederacy, 1861–1865 (New York, 1998), 135. For an exami-
nation of Lincoln’s vision and plan of wartime Reconstruction in the South and specifically North
Carolina, see Harris, With Charity for All, especially chap. 3. In one of the best treatments of
Union military policy in occupied areas, Mark Grimsley argues that conciliation died with Union
defeats outside Richmond in 1862. Union authorities then moved toward a “pragmatic” policy,
between conciliation and hard war. Grimsley, Hard Hand of War, 3, 47–119. For more on the
shift in Union policy away from conciliation, see also Ash, When the Yankees Came, 50–53;
Michael Fellman, Citizen Sherman: A Life of William Tecumseh Sherman (New York, 1995),
chap. 9; and Mark Grimsley, “Conciliation and Its Failure, 1861–1862,” Civil War History. 39
(December 1993), 317–35. The benchmark work for southern reactions to occupation is Ash,
When the Yankees Came.

Kenzer, eds., Enemies of the Country: New Perspectives on Unionists in the Civil War South
(Athens, Ga., 2001), 8.
initially resisted secession—it serves as an excellent case study not only because it foreshadows the difficulties surrounding Federal Reconstruction policies but also because it reveals the complex nature of wartime occupation and complicates historians’ understanding of what it meant to be a Unionist.\(^5\)

In the Carteret region, there were Unionists, secessionists, and those who held no firm allegiance to either side. Contemporaries and scholars alike have found it difficult to define what constituted a Unionist in the South, much less in eastern North Carolina. Parson Brownlow offered a rigid definition: a Unionist was one who showed “unmitigated hostility” to Confederates and “uncompromising devotion” to... and a willingness to risk life and property “in defense of the” Union. Though scholars have discovered such sentiments in Appalachia, Alabama, and other regions, very few eastern North Carolinians fit Brownlow’s description. Their exposure to occupying forces and policies forced Carteret residents to decide which values were dearest to them. The community, whose white population had been only reluctant secessionists in 1861 and rather agreeable Unionists in 1862, ultimately chose values more closely attuned to Confederate sensibilities than Union ones by 1865. In order to understand how and why the people of the Carteret region behaved as they did during occupation, however, one must understand the circumstances from which they came.\(^6\)

\(^5\) By the Carteret region, I mean Beaufort and its hinterland, extending forty miles to New Bern, the county seat of adjacent Craven County. Though this article concentrates primarily on the recorded experiences of the local residents of Beaufort and Carteret County (primarily because of the wealth of data), it is important to note that similar experiences of occupation applied to residents of New Bern and Craven County (where comparatively little data is extant). An overwhelming majority of the white population had fled New Bern upon the approach of the Union army, leaving behind those without means to leave as well as those whose Confederate convictions were not as strong. The letters of Union soldiers and northern officials reveal that they perceived New Bern and Beaufort to be identical in their attitudes during wartime occupation. Therefore, when I refer to the “region” during the war, I am referring to both towns and their respective counties. The Union soldiers saw no distinction in their attitudes, and therefore I shall not either.

Throughout the antebellum era, Beaufort citizens sought to advance their small port from its Rip van Winkle attitude. Though it had been founded in the early eighteenth century, by 1840 Beaufort was still a struggling town, with streets and sidewalks that were “continuous banks or drifts of sand,” only “a few stores[,] . . . no market house, a court house, and but one church.” Some local leaders attempted to start a cotton factory, while some young men sought their fortunes in California’s gold mines, only to find “the wave washed shores of old Carteret far more attractive, if not more profitable, than the golden shores of California.” But Beaufort’s “wave washed shores” proved to be one of its most profitable assets, not necessarily for commercial traffic but for personal recreation. Wealthy socialites from all over North Carolina and the nation chose Beaufort as a vacation spot to enjoy the cool sea breezes in the height of summer. By 1861 Beaufort was a prosperous port and home to several moderately wealthy merchants and hotelkeepers. Indeed, residents of the county were primarily fishermen, small merchants, shopkeepers, and yeoman farmers. Very few planters lived in this coastal community, and slaves constituted less than 25 percent of the county’s population. As a result, most Carteret County residents felt removed from the siege mentality that affected much of the Deep South and many North Carolina black belt counties, including neighboring Craven County, where the slave population neared 50 percent.7

During the crisis of 1850, James Manney, a Beaufort physician, wrote, “We are devoted to the Union, in the ‘Old North State’; we would rather all the abolitionists and negroes should be drowned in the

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7 “Beaufort Long Ago was Quiet and Good,” Beaufort News, November 29, 1923 (first quotation); James Manney to John M. Morehead, December 8, 1847, James Manney Letter Book #4533 (Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; hereinafter cited as SHC) (cotton factory); Undated letter to the editor (typescript), Unprocessed material, Box 2, F. C. Salisbury Collection, NCSA (second quotation); William Jeffrey to David S. Reid, August 30, 1858, David S. Reid Papers, NCSA (elite vacation spot); William Woods Holden to Miss L. H. Holden, August 6, 1858, in Horace W. Raper and Thornton W. Mitchell, eds., The Papers of William Woods Holden. Vol. 1: 1841–1868 (Raleigh, 2000), 95 (elite vacation spot); Manuscript Census Returns, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Carteret County, North Carolina, Schedules 1 and 4, Population and Slave, and Craven County, North Carolina, Schedules 1 and 4, Population and Slave. National Archives Microfilm Series M-653, reels 890, 894, and 921; hereinafter cited as NAMS M-653.
Atlantic Ocean, than our glorious Union ... should be dissolved.” Manney denounced both “the crazy abolitionists at the North and the crazy pro-slavery men of the South” who “are striving with all their strength to rend asunder the bonds which unite us as one people and made us the greatest and most prosperous Republic which has ever existed.” Undoubtedly, Manney felt that he spoke for Carteret County when he declared, “I am willing to lay down my life at any hour, rather than see our stripes torn or one star blotted from our glorious banner.”

John Brown’s raid in October 1859, however, started changing local attitudes. Even in a county with a small slave population, whites feared the potential for slave revolt. Whites in both Carteret and Craven Counties had always been vigilant for any improper ideas their slaves might develop. They were acutely aware that the coastal port environment exposed slaves to dangerous outside ideas and influences. As historian David S. Cecelski has noted, black seamen who frequented the ports imbued many coastal slaves with the ideas of freedom in the larger world. Whites, not only in the North Carolina coastal counties but also throughout the South, utilized slave patrols, militias, intimidation, and the courts to maintain racial subjugation. Brown’s raid, apparently sponsored by northern Republican abolitionists, threatened to disrupt the delicate racial balance.

In New Bern, the seat of Craven County, a newspaper editor argued that all northern teachers and booksellers should be considered potential abolitionist incendiaries, and he further proclaimed, “No Southern merchant should buy a dollar’s worth of merchandise from a nigger freedom shrieking abolitionist under any circumstance.” Though the population of New Bern held rallies denouncing northern aggression, beseeched the governor for better arms, and created volunteer cavalry companies in preparation for the impending crisis, the citizens of Carteret County were chary of disunion and armed resistance. After the election of 1860, residents of Craven held secessionist meetings while those in Carteret sponsored Unionist ones. In February 1861 the people of Craven County voted in favor of a secession convention by over 500 votes and elected secessionist delegates. Carteret’s voters supported

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8 James Manney to George E. Badger, February 7, 1849 (first quotation); James Manney to Editors of the Republic [November 1849] (second and third quotations); James Manney to Zachary Taylor, February 18, 1850 (fourth quotation), all in Manney Letter Book.

9 David S. Cecelski, The Waterman’s Song: Slavery and Freedom in Maritime North Carolina (Chapel Hill, 2001), xvi, 141-51. For a lucid exploration of slave patrols, one of the primary mechanisms for regulating the black population, see Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), especially chaps. 4-5.
the convention by only twenty-one votes, and they elected a Unionist delegate. As Governor John W. Ellis wrote, "Some favor Submission, some resistance and others still would await the course of events that might follow." Most Carteret residents favored the latter option.

But when President Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand troops on April 15, 1861, one day after Fort Sumter’s surrender, Carteret residents reacted angrily and issued a proclamation declaring "the honor and best interests of North Carolina demand that her connection with the present Union be dissolved . . . ." Lincoln did not realize the depth of the state’s fear of arbitrary power. North Carolinians interpreted his call for troops as heralding the institution of abolitionist military tyranny in the South. Furthermore, Lincoln’s call alienated other states in the upper South, prompting Virginia, Tennessee, and Arkansas to secede along with North Carolina and persuading many conditional Unionists to throw in their lot with secessionists.

To be sure, some local men did not need Lincoln’s threat to support the cause of secession. Immediately after learning that shots had been fired at Fort Sumter, Josiah Solomon Pender, the forty-two-year-old prosperous owner of Beaufort’s magnificent Atlantic House Hotel, led a small group of friends to capture Fort Macon. The task was not difficult, as only one individual, serving primarily as a maintenance man, inhabited it. The Federal officer left the fort, and Pender’s group replaced the U.S. flag with improvised Confederate colors. Unlike


Pender and his friends, however, most Carteret men abandoned the Union only after Lincoln’s call for troops. Job L. Kinsey, a native farmer who later served as a Confederate spy in the region during the latter part of the war, acknowledged, “I was a Union man at first, but afterwards went into the Confederate army.” Similarly, William Rowe, a farmer, testified to postwar Federal investigators, “At first I was a union man,” but “afterwards my sympathies were with the confederacy.” Clifford Simpson testified that he was “strictly loyal until the state seceded and went out of the union and I then followed my State.”

These statements not only illustrate the shift from Unionist attitudes as a result of Lincoln’s action but also reveal the complex nature of loyalty in the region—as some men proclaimed loyalty to the Confederacy, others identified specifically with their state. Even though many Carteret residents felt Lincoln’s actions were evidence of an intolerable coercion of southern states, their allegiance to the Confederacy, with some exceptions, proved more conditional than absolute. As William Blair asserted in his study of Virginia’s Confederate identity, “people may not fight for the nation but for the community or neighborhood.” However, “When local goals fall into line with national purpose, the combination creates a powerful motivating force.” Carteret enlistment patterns imply that most men in the region considered their foremost loyalty to be to their own community. But by fighting for their own small corner of the Confederacy, they were, by extension, defending the nation.

Local young men joined Carteret companies with the understanding

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13 Blair, Virginia’s Private War, 141 (quotations), 146. For an explanation of how national identity interconnects with local identity, see David M. Potter, “The Historian’s Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa,” in Potter, The South and the Sectional Conflict (Baton Rouge, 1968), 34–83. Citizens of the Carteret region, of course, had many competing loyalties. As Thomas G. Dyer has perceptively written, people have always had multiple loyalties: “Allegiances to family, home, friends, lodges, church, class, state, and region (among others) competed with or complemented national loyalty.” In peacetime, loyalties can complement each other, but in wartime “demands arise that national loyalty be paramount and controlling.” See Dyer, Secret Yankees, 4. For more on the concept of multiple loyalties, see Harold Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization (Princeton, 1955) and George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships (New York, 1993).
that the companies would remain in their home county, guarding the coastline and manning Fort Macon. Josiah Pender, who had captured Fort Macon, recognized this spirit and organized a company to serve as garrison troops for the fort. His company officially mustered into service as the aptly named “Beaufort Harbor Guards” on June 1, 1861, enlisting nearly a hundred men. When Benjamin Leecraft, a prominent local merchant, attempted to raise another company of Carteret men, he discovered that these local conditional Confederates would serve only under the stipulation that they could remain at home. These men perceived the potential Federal threat primarily in local terms. Leecraft lamented that he “could not succeed in raising a company to go any where on Southern Soil to repel the invader,” but he explained to Governor Ellis that “a large number would enlist for the War provided they could have the assurance that they would be retained in the County.” Ellis consented, and Leecraft enlisted sixty-nine men by October 1861.14

Other local company leaders had more practical incentives to display their martial ardor than just patriotic zeal. Forty-two-year-old Stephen Decatur Pool sought to enhance his flagging prestige within the community. Unlike Pender and Leecraft, Pool was not wealthy. A credit agent for R. G. Dun and Company reported that Pool’s income as a schoolteacher and the editor of the “Beaufort Journal” had decreased progressively. While acknowledging that Pool was “married and of very fine character,” the agent deemed him a “slow pay” on his debts and, more to the point, “a bad manager and has but little means.” In 1860 the agent wrote that Pool was “a hard case[;] consider him insolvent (or he won’t pay his debts which is worse).” Finally on February 19, 1861, the agent concluded that Pool was “not worth anything.”15

Though he had tried to maintain his role as a leader in the community, Pool had not been able to secure a position even within the county court system since February 1859. The county commissioners did not trust him in a position of fiscal responsibility. The sense of shame and loss of honor, in a society that respected men for their ability to materially provide for their families, must have been severe to this father

of ten. Another way southern society allowed one to regain honor and save face was through the display of manly, martial acts. For Pool, the war could not come fast enough, as he hoped to regain lost honor and perhaps rehabilitate his professional reputation in Beaufort society. On May 21, 1861, he organized the "Topsail Rifles," Company H of the Tenth North Carolina Regiment, and was commissioned captain. Enlisting a company for the war served as a public commitment to combat on the field of honor.16

The sense of honor that accompanied the display of martial actions proved quite attractive to Carteret's youth. Throughout the war, primarily young men flocked to these Confederate companies, while their fathers, regardless of class, remained much more guarded.17 Reuben Fulcher, a poor Beaufort fisherman, "begged [his eighteen-year-old son, Wallace] not to go in the service, but he would not listen to me." Early in 1862 Elijah Whitehurst and a couple of loyal friends had "frequently met and discussed the better way to get to the federal Blockade fleet off Beaufort Harbor in case they were drafted in the Rebel army." Naturally he was despondent when his son, Samuel, "left against the wishes of his family" and joined the Confederate service at age seventeen. Gabriel Hardison, a Craven County farmer, lamented his teenage son's departure to the army. A relative declared: "When [Gabriel] came home and found him gone he said he would rather have found him dead." When Jesse Fulcher applied to the Southern Claims Commission after the war for compensation for his confiscated property, he reluctantly admitted, "I had a son in the Confederate army." Fulcher asserted that he "contributed nothing to supply him with mili-

16 1860 U.S. Census, Carteret County, N.C., Population, NAMS M-653, reel 890; Manarin, comp., North Carolina Troops, I, 124–37. For further examination of the role of violence and combat in the creation and reaffirmation of masculine codes of honor, see Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York, 1982); Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South (Boulder, Colo., 1996); and Pieter Spierenburg, ed., Men and Violence: Gender, Honor, and Rituals in Modern Europe and America ([Columbus, Ohio], 1998).

17 This contrasts with what Margaret M. Storey discovered in her study of Alabama Unionists. Storey argues that Alabama Unionists "took it as a matter of duty that they should reproduce their own political loyalty among their sons, grandsons, and nephews. . . [and] they frequently demanded that the actions of younger male relatives reflect, and sometimes directly extend, their own loyalty to the Union." Margaret M. Storey, "Civil War Unionists and the Political Culture of Loyalty in Alabama, 1860–1861," Journal of Southern History, 69 (February 2003), 89–90. However, W. Todd Groce, whose work identifies and explains the substantial but historically neglected Confederate presence in East Tennessee, also finds that many Unionist fathers were dismayed to watch their sons join the Confederate cause over their objections. W. Todd Groce, Mountain Rebels: East Tennessee Confederates and the Civil War, 1860–1870 (Knoxville, 1999), chap. 4.
tary equipment or money," and he testified that his son had joined "without my consent or approval." The commission still rejected his claim.\(^\text{18}\)

As these parental laments reveal, Lincoln's call for troops had not altered everyone's allegiance; some tried to remain committed to Union principles in the face of a secessionist martial furor. In the early days of the war, local Confederate enthusiasts tried to intimidate those who publicly maintained their fidelity to the old Union. The southern partisans used traditional southern methods for community discipline and social control—including social ostracism, humiliation, and violence. Isaac Hill, a farmer and county road supervisor, "vehemently opposed the actions of the secessionists." In 1861 a soldier of the Seventh North Carolina regiment "cocked his gun at him and told him he was a damned Yankey," while another "drew his bayonet and attempted to strike him with it." Hill claimed such abuse did not hurt him personally but "frightened my wife so much that she died here days afterward." David Morton, a grocer, whose nephew joined the Confederacy, got into trouble with a Beaufort crowd one day in 1861. His friend related: "one time we were out at the brickyard where they were drilling the Confederate malitia [sic] [...] something was said concerning the Northern people and about how many Northern soldiers it would take to whip the crowd and [Morton] said three would whip the crowd, and they wanted to ride him on a rail for what he said. They called him a 'dam abolitionist.'" Jesse Fulcher, whose son had joined Captain Pender's company against his father's wishes, ran afool of the captain, who "threatened to put a gag in my mouth and place me in close confinement." Thomas Hall claimed that in the summer of 1861 at Morehead City he "was threatened with imprisonment by Mrs. Vance, wife of Col. Z. B. Vance." Soldiers of Vance's regiment "burnt my boat & part of my fence and robbed my kitchen, and one of

\(^{18}\)Testimony of claimant Reuben Fulcher, Claim 13819, Carteret County, North Carolina, Records of the Southern Claims Commission, 1871-1880, Disallowed Claims, Records of the United States House of Representatives, Record Group 233, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; hereinafter cited as RG 233 (first quotation); Testimony of William H. Congleton, and Testimony of Claimant Joseph B. Whitehurst, both in Claim 1664, Carteret County, North Carolina, Settled Case Files for Claims Approved by the Southern Claims Commission, 1871-1880, Records of the Accounting Officers of the Department of the Treasury, Record Group 217, National Archives II, College Park, Md.; hereinafter cited as RG 217 (second and third quotations); Deposition of George Hardison, Gabriel Hardison v. United States (case file no. 8070), RG 123 (fourth quotation); Testimony of claimant Jesse Fulcher, Claim 19070, Carteret County, RG 233 (fifth, sixth, and seventh quotations). For more on how the Southern Claims Commission operated, see Frank W. Klingberg, The Southern Claims Commission (Berkeley, 1955).
them threatened to take my life." Hall remembered, "Generally, I was very much annoyed on account of my Union sentiments, especially by being called a 'whitewashed yankee.'"^19

Confederate bullies fled the region when authentic Yankees arrived in March 1862. The Union forces began a month-long siege of Fort Macon, where over one-third of the 441 men in Colonel Moses White's garrison were Carteret County men, serving in the companies raised by Stephen D. Pool and Josiah Pender. At 5:40 A.M. on the morning of April 25, the inevitable bombardment finally erupted, and the shelling lasted eleven hours. Long before the Union shells started filling the morning sky over Fort Macon, discontent had been brewing among the men of the garrison. Not only were they outraged when White threatened to turn the fort's guns on Beaufort to prevent the Union from entering it, but also the local men were distraught that they could not protect their families from the enemy. White acknowledged that the men "seemed to be dissatisfied with being shut up in such a small place, so near their relations and friends, but unable to communicate with them." Finally, the fort's garrison surrendered on the morning of April 26. When the men surrendered, General Burnside paroled them and allowed them to return to their homes until formally released through a prisoner exchange, which occurred four months later.^20

Unlike other occupied areas of the South—especially Louisiana and West Tennessee—the presence of Union forces in the Carteret region did not bring forth hordes of guerrillas and bushwhackers.^21 The transfer of power was relatively peaceful. Many Carteret residents shifted

^19 Deposition of H. B. Hill (first quotation), "Brief for the Claimant on Loyalty," December term, 1886 (second and third quotations), and Deposition of Isaac S. Hill (fourth quotation), all in Nancy C. Hill, administratrix of the estate of Isaac S. Hill, deceased vs. United States (case file no. 1191), RG 123; Deposition of Zem Garner, in David W. Morton vs. United States (case file no. 6935), RG 123 (fifth quotation); Testimony of claimant Jesse Fulcher, Claim 19070, Carteret County, RG 217 (seventh, eighth, and ninth quotations); 1860 U.S. Census, Carteret County, N.C., Population. NAMS M-653, reel 890. For further depictions of the methods of enforcing community values, see Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, part III, especially pp. 435-38.

^20 John G. Parke to Lewis Richmond, May 9, 1862 (bombardment), Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. IX, 284; John G. Parke to Ambrose Burnside, March 26, 1862, ibid., 279 (threats to shell Beaufort); Moses J. White to Theophilus H. Holmes, May 4, 1862, ibid., 293 (quotation); and "Terms of Capitulation," ibid., 276 (parole).

^21 Grimsley, Hard Hand of War, 111-19; Fellman, Citizen Sherman, 137-48; Donald S. Frazier, "'Out of Stinking Distance': The Guerrilla War in Louisiana," in Daniel E. Sutherland, ed., Guerrillas, Unionists, and Violence on the Confederate Home Front (Fayetteville, Ark., 1999), 151-70. For other explorations of guerilla warfare, see Robert R. Mackey, The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865 (Norman, Okla., 2004); Crawford, Ashe County's Civil War; and Noel C. Fisher, War at Every Door: Partisan Politics and Guerrilla Violence in East Tennessee, 1860-1869 (Chapel Hill, 1997).
their allegiances, falling back into the more comfortable role of supporter of the old and venerable Union. While joining the Confederacy had had its economic benefits in the spring of 1861, whites of all classes a year later proved adept at negotiating with the military authorities—no matter what color uniform they wore—to preserve their property and livelihood. In the spring of 1862, Carteret residents quickly proclaimed their support for the Union, especially after witnessing how northern troops treated secessionist property. Immediately upon arriving in Beaufort, northern troops took possession of Pender’s Atlantic House Hotel. After taking its most valuable furniture, the Union army converted the hotel into a major hospital for much of the war. Seeing the treatment of the Atlantic House Hotel, George W. Taylor, forty-eight-year-old proprietor of the Ocean House Hotel, let few daylight hours pass before he had agreed to operate his establishment as a boarding house for Union officials.\(^{22}\)

In June 1862 the Union provost marshal granted a Boston merchant “permission to occupy the store formerly occupied by Benjamin Leecraft, the owner having joined the CSA Army.” James Rumley, the forty-nine-year-old clerk of the county court and an inveterate secessionist, witnessed slaves help themselves to bed and table furniture and “even the dresses of Mr. Leecraft’s deceased wife and child.” Yet, trying to preserve his own interests, Rumley did not object to the Union authorities about such outrages. The Union army usually had a minimum of two regiments stationed at Beaufort (approximately a thousand active-duty soldiers), with anywhere between two thousand and fifteen thousand troops at various times stationed at New Bern, a short distance away. This probably helped persuade many Unionists to proclaim openly their loyalty and also tended to make secessionists keep their dissent private. Rumley is a perfect example of the latter choice. Rumley befriended John A. Hedrick, the U.S. Treasury Department collector for Beaufort, and projected a neutral facade in public interaction with Union officials, while secretly spouting his rage into his diary.\(^{23}\)

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22 Undated entry [before April 23, 1862], Rumley Diary, Pigott Collection (Pender’s hotel); John A. Hedrick to Benjamin S. Hedrick, June 20, 1862, and October 25, 1863, in Judkin Browning and Michael Thomas Smith, eds., Letters from a North Carolina Unionist: John A. Hedrick to Benjamin S. Hedrick, 1862–1865 (Raleigh, 2001), 7–8 and 163–64 (Taylor’s hotel). Pender’s Atlantic House Hotel became Hammond General Hospital from April 1862 until it was closed on January 14, 1865. See Johnston, “Pender, Josiah Solomon,” 62–63; and Entry dated January 14, 1865, Edmund Janes Cleveland Diary #2888, SHC.

23 Untitled order from “Headquarters, Provost Marshal,” Beaufort, N.C., July 20, 1862, Alfred H. Martine Papers #3706, SHC (first quotation); Undated entry [before April 23, 1862], Rumley
The situation of Joel Henry Davis is an instructive example of how local whites negotiated with those in authority. A prosperous Beaufort merchant who owned fifteen slaves at the outbreak of the war, the fifty-seven-year-old Davis initially accepted secession. Two of Davis's sons also demonstrated their allegiance to the Confederacy, enlisting as privates in Pool's company on May 25, 1861. Nevertheless, the elder Davis, realizing the economic benefits that might accrue to his business, quickly supported the Union authorities when they occupied Beaufort, and he even allowed John Hedrick to use a room in his store for an office. In September 1862 the naive Hedrick wrote confidently that Davis had "contended for the Union all the time..."²⁴

After surrendering with the Fort Macon garrison on April 26, 1862, Davis's two sons forsook the Confederate army and took the oath of allegiance like their father. One of these sons even opened a billiard parlor and bowling alley behind the provost marshal's office. Other Carteret soldiers from Fort Macon's garrison also decided to return to the Union fold. Levi Woodbury Pigott, a thirty-one-year-old former teacher, applied to John Hedrick for a position in the U.S. Treasury Department. After his parole, twenty-two-year-old mariner John W. Day operated a poorhouse about seven miles outside Beaufort and provided entertainment for Union soldiers. These were by no means the only local soldiers who abandoned their Confederate units. Fourteen men deserted before Fort Macon fell. Of the 177 Carteret men who were captured and paroled at the fort, 56 did not return to their units after their exchange, and 17 others who did return soon deserted. In addition, 31 of Captain Benjamin Leecraft's 66 soldiers never returned to their company after the company retreated at the battle of New Bern on March 14, 1862. Thus, in an inversion of James M. McPherson's famous thesis, these men had decided not only that they were not fighting for the "cause" but also that they were not fighting for their "comrades."²⁵

²⁴ North Carolina, Vol. 5, p. 176-L, R. G. Dun & Co. Collection (Davis as merchant); 1860 U.S. Census, Carteret County, N.C., Population and Slave, NAMS M-653, reels 890 and 921; Manarin, comp., North Carolina Troops, I, 128 (sons join Pool's company); John A. Hedrick to Benjamin S. Hedrick, July 10, 1862 (use of room) and September 8, 1862 (quotation), in Browning and Smith, eds., Letters from a North Carolina Unionist, 13, 34.

²⁵ Businessmen were required to take the oath. See James Rumley diary, undated entry [before April 23, 1862]; and James E. Glazier to Annie G. Monroe, October 26, 1862, James Edward Glazier Papers (Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.). Glazier wrote that "the white people of this city have had their choice—to take the oath or leave." I would like to thank
However, there was a distinctive class dynamic involved with those who had forsaken their companies. Primarily lower-class men discarded their Confederate uniforms, while wealthier men returned to their units. The average household wealth of Carteret men who abandoned their units was $1,181, while the average household wealth of those who returned to duty and remained was $4,067. Many of those with substantial holdings found Union authorities had commandeered their houses and confiscated their slaves during their absence. Though some were certainly attached to the Confederate cause, wealthier men undoubtedly reckoned that the only way to regain their property and status was to win the war; hence they returned to their Confederate units. With many of the elite members of society absent, lower-class men saw the occupation as an opportunity for economic and perhaps even social advancement. Prospects for economic gain under the Federal aegis enticed some poor men to return home. Unionist David Morton advised his nephew, who was serving in Pool’s company, “to leave the army and come home [because] there was a chance for him to make money here.”

While some Carteret County men demonstrated their loyalty by taking the oath of allegiance and resuming business as usual, others actively aided the Union forces. James B. Roberts, who had refused to join his two brothers in the Confederate army, acted as a cavalry guide and as a pilot for Union ships plying the Neuse River toward New Bern. Indigent local fishermen served as pilots for the Union naval vessels in the Beaufort harbor. Isaac Hill, who had been threatened by Confederate soldiers earlier, worked as a government naval-stores inspector. Several lower-class men even enlisted in local Union regiments, earning the derisive nickname “buffaloes” from unsympathetic

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Michael Thomas Smith for researching the Glazier papers for me. Manarin, comp., North Carolina Troops, I, 128 (Davis), 129 (Day), 134 and 434 (Pigott), 101-37 (Carteret troops at Fort Macon), 269-72 (Leecraft’s company); Entries dated January 12, 1865 (Day’s poorhouse) and February 16, 1865 (Davis’s billiard parlor), Cleveland Diary; John A. Hedrick to Benjamin S. Hedrick, June 22 and July 10, 1862, in Browning and Smith, eds., Letters from a North Carolina Unionist, 7-8 and 13 (Pigott’s application); James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York, 1997).

26 Deposition of J. T. Dennis, in David W. Morton v. United States (case file no. 6935), RG 123 (quotation). I computed average wealth by cross-referencing the company rosters with the census population schedules. For average household wealth, I added the total value of personal property and the value of real estate from the 1860 census for the households in which each enlistee lived and then divided that sum by the number of enlistees for whom records could be found. The enlistee did not have to personally own the wealth in the household. Manarin, comp., North Carolina Troops, I, 104-37, 269-72, 301-11; Weymouth T. Jordan Jr., comp., North Carolina Troops, 1861–1865: A Roster. Vol. IV: Infantry (Raleigh, 1973), 174-84; 1860 U.S. Census, Carteret County, N.C., Population, NAMS M-653, reel 890.
residents. The Federal government organized four companies of the First and Second North Carolina Union Volunteer Infantry Regiments in Beaufort in 1862 and 1863; nearly three dozen Carteret men—whose average wealth was only $489—joined, while many others were turned away due to physical disability or age.27

No matter how they interacted with Federal troops, the majority of local white residents simply tried to reestablish the daily rhythms of their lives as they had existed before the war. Most residents had only been lukewarm or reluctant Confederates to begin with, and they welcomed the Union troops and especially their dollars. One Union soldier noted that local residents had started warming to the Union occupiers when northern merchant vessels laden with goods began arriving at Beaufort docks by June 1862. The soldier witnessed local businesses reopen “with cheerfulness and profit,” and “many of the most rabid among them soon dropped their patriotic allusion to the Confederacy, and began to consider themselves as part and parcel of the United States Government once more.”28

The promise of economic prosperity and maintaining the antebellum social order—especially white control over black slaves—further encouraged white residents. The appointment of Edward Stanly as military governor reassured the locals. Stanly had been ordered to enforce antebellum North Carolina laws, and being a native of the region, he took the orders seriously. Union officials had also promised to preserve the antebellum status quo. Ambrose Burnside had issued a proclamation on February 16, 1862, shortly after Union forces captured

27 J. Madison Drake, The History of the Ninth New Jersey Veteran Vols.: A Record of Its Service . . . (Elizabeth, N.J., 1889), 79 (Roberts as cavalry guide); Testimony of claimant James Roberts, Claim 12135, Carteret County, RG 217 (Roberts as pilot, disagreement with brothers); Testimony of claimant William T. Fulcher, Claim 9860, Carteret County, Testimony of claimant Asa Piver, Claim 15876, Carteret County, and Testimony of claimant Blount Cherry, Claim 11628, Carteret County, all in RG 217 (indigent fisherman guides); Deposition of Isaac S. Hill, in Nancy C. Hill, administratrix of the estate of Isaac S. Hill, deceased v. United States (case file no. 1191), RG 123 (Hill as inspector); First and Second Regiments N.C. Infantry, Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Union Soldiers who served in Organizations from the State of North Carolina, Records of Volunteer Union Soldiers Who Served during the Civil War, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (microfilm at NCSA); hereinafter cited as RG 94; 1860 U.S. Census, Carteret County, N.C., Population, NAMS M-653, reel 890. Many enlistees were rejected because they were over forty-five years of age. A. W. Woodhull to Maj. Southard Hoffman, September 9, 1862, Box 1, Part I, Letters Received, Department of North Carolina, Records of United States Army Continental Commands, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; hereinafter cited as RG 393. For more information on the First and Second North Carolina Union regiments and the etymology of buffaloes, see Judkin Jay Browning, “‘Little Souled Mercenaries’? The Buffaloes of Eastern North Carolina during the Civil War,” North Carolina Historical Review, 77 (July 2000), 337–63.

Roanoke Island, vowing not to interfere with North Carolina laws, institutions, or property. The New Bern Daily Progress, which had been commandeered by Union soldier-editors, assured residents on March 26: “We are not fighting for the perpetuation or annihilation of the peculiar institution of the South. We propose to let the people of the South manage their Negro question as seems best to them.”

The result of these overtures was that throughout the first few months of occupation, local whites generally accepted Union occupation without much conflict. Daniel Read Lamed, General Burnside’s personal secretary, formed the impression that “Beaufort is loyal to a great extent” and further asserted, “I have no doubt when these people become better acquainted with us, and our intentions, they will come out in support of our Government.” A Rhode Island soldier wrote, “The people there seemed to be about equally divided on the question of loyalty,” but he admitted that they “welcomed our troops, in many instances with seeming cordiality.” A New Jersey soldier detected a more class-oriented allegiance. “Nearly every family,” he wrote, “especially the poorer classes (‘white trash,’ as the planters called them,) possessed a love for the ‘old flag,’ and they joyfully hailed their deliverance from the bondage from which we had released them.”

John Hedrick arrived in Beaufort on June 12, 1862, and after a week of interacting with the local residents, observed, “Some are Secessionists but the greater number are Union men now and I think always have been.” After the war, a Rhode Island soldier, whose regiment departed for Virginia on July 6, 1862, fondly remembered, “We can never forget our life in Beaufort, or the pleasant relations sustained with its inhabitants.”

Yet, by 1863 few northern soldiers would describe their interactions with locals as pleasant. One soldier complained after nearly a year of occupation, “I doubt very much the union feeling in North Carolina”; another proclaimed in May 1863, “I don’t believe that there is a union man in North Carolina.”

30 Daniel Read Lamed to Henry Howe, March 26, 1862 (first quotation), and Daniel Read Lamed to Mrs. Ambrose E. Burnside, March 30, 1862 (second quotation), Box 1, Daniel Read Lamed Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.); John K. Burlingame, History of the Fifth Regiment of Rhode Island Heavy Artillery ... (Providence, 1892), 59 (third and fourth quotations); Drake, History of the Ninth New Jersey Veteran Vols., 71 (fifth and sixth quotations); John A. Hedrick to Benjamin S. Hedrick, June 20, 1862, in Browning and Smith, eds., Letters from a North Carolina Unionist, 7 (seventh quotation); Allen, Forty-Six Months with the Fourth R.I. Volunteers, 119-22 (eighth quotation on p. 119).
Regiment grumbled about the locals: "They may talk Unionism and take the oath of allegiance, but I have no faith in them, for I think they value their oath no more than they do a piece of blank paper." "Union men at heart are as scarce as hen's teeth here," another soldier declared in March 1863, "but there is plenty of professed union men who will shote [sic] you out of the window if they get a chance." A disillusioned Massachusetts soldier offered a particularly mordant appraisal after spending ten months in Carteret region: "A year ago... I supposed we were going to help a poor oppressed people who were forced into the rebellion by a minority—now I have learned that the whole south is united. They can continue the war forever if necessary." He further bemoaned, "they hate the old flag—they hate free government—they hate every principal of right—they are not worthy to be called Americans—our nation would be stronger and better without them."

This abrupt shift in the tone of Union soldiers' correspondence occurred primarily because reactions from local whites had become increasingly hostile. Many Beaufort whites were disillusioned with both the local tactics and the larger Federal policies of the occupying force. To some, the Union soldiers acted increasingly undisciplined, especially on expeditions into the countryside. Civilians who had taken oaths of allegiance but who lived outside the occupied towns complained to Governor Stanly of ill treatment. Stanly protested to the department's commander, "In numerous instances, well authenticated, [Union soldiers] entered and robbed the houses of loyal men, destroyed furniture, insulted women, and treated with scorn the protections, which by your advice I had given them." Similarly, when local residents spoke in animated, harsh tones to soldiers about perceived grievances, retaliations became increasingly more destructive. Stanly lamented in late 1862, "House-burning seems becoming, not an extreme medicine of war, but a matter of amusement, to the [Union soldiers]."32

These were not the actions of a wayward few. Destructive expedi-
tions sent into the countryside from occupied coastal North Carolina towns were part of a Union policy designed to deprive the Confederacy not only of the cotton crop but also of grazing lands for southern cavalry and foodstuffs for the army. Union soldiers even prided themselves on their pillaging prowess. "If you could see the ruin devastation and utter abandonment of villages. Plantations and farms, which but a short time ago was Peopled, fenced and stocked," one soldier wrote his wife, had been "either burned or deserted . . . ." There were "[n]o cows horses mules sheep or poultry to be seen where ever the Union army advances . . . ." Though Stanly and the locals resented them, these new, harsher measures were part of formal Federal policy—indicative of the retreat from conciliation—that was being implemented in many areas of the South.\textsuperscript{33}

In addition to using heavy-handed measures against local property, the Federal government started enacting stricter policies regarding civilians suspected of disloyalty, including an 1863 order to banish disloyal citizens from occupied southern territories. Union officials in the Carteret region evicted those who refused to take or reneged on the oath of allegiance. Similar to policies in occupied St. Louis, Missouri, such extreme attempts to suppress disloyalty severely damaged the relationship between Union forces and the civil society they were trying to support. Further damage occurred when Union soldiers and recruiting agents started harassing Carteret civilians, as well as Confederate deserters and refugees who fled to Union lines, trying to coerce them into joining the First and Second North Carolina Union Regiments. Some Union officers advocated filling up regular Union regiments with the local populace: "Are not all our regiments, batteries, &c to be encouraged to recruit their respective commands from among the people of this state, including refugees, deserters &c?" Ironically, that same officer was later embarrassed to learn that recruiting agents "have by display of firearms, threats of personal violence, imprisonment as rebels, spies &c, attempted to compel men to enlist." John Hedrick explained, "The way, the deserters and refugees are treated, is to put them into prison until they are willing to volunteer in the Union Army." Though he was unsure how long they were confined in jail, Hedrick observed that "they always let them out when they do

\textsuperscript{33} William Augustus Willoughby to wife, January 22, 1863, in Nina Silber and Mary Beth Sievens, eds., \textit{Yankee Correspondence: Civil War Letters between New England Soldiers and the Home Front} (Charlottesville, 1996), 97 (quotations); Grimsley, \textit{Hard Hand of War}, chaps. 4–5 (Union policy).
volunteer." Hedrick further commented that a combination of material destitution and peer pressure induced refugees to enlist. Comparing it to a sort of freshman hazing reminiscent "of my old Davidson College days," Hedrick narrated, "When a refugee comes in... All the Buffaloes get after him and before he knows what he is about he has joined the regiment."34

James Rumley agreed with Hedrick's depiction of Union actions, but Rumley more strongly condemned the coercive tactics: "[Refugees] come in squads of four or five, and as soon as they set foot upon the place are besieged by Buffalo recruiting officers (who are swarming over the county) and are wheedled or frightened into the Federal service." Rumley viewed these men with a mixture of indignation and pity: "Some poor deluded wretches enter there, and are induced by false representations to sell themselves to the public enemies of their country." In somewhat calmer moments, Rumley blamed this treason on destitution. He argued that the recruiting effort "has been materially aided by the establishment of a public subsistence store in Beaufort, where the families of volunteers are gratuitously supplied."35

Many who had voluntarily joined the army, primarily for the provisions and steady pay to relieve their families' suffering, started to slip away in small numbers by 1864 due to their perception of negligence by the Federal government. As one colonel pleaded in January 1864, when payroll was over four months behind, "mere personal persuasion and influence are not sufficient, without at least some money, to hold

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34 Joseph Barlow to Ellen, October 25, 1862, Barlow Papers (eviction); Entry dated November 25, 1862, William Seagraves Diary [typescript], Civil War Times Illustrated Collection, USAMHI (eviction); Oliver W. Peabody to Mary L. Peabody, April 21, 1863, Oliver W. Peabody Papers, MHS (eviction); Louis S. Gerteis, "A Friend of the Enemy": Federal Efforts to Suppress Disloyalty in St. Louis During the Civil War," Missouri Historical Review, 96 (April 2002), 165-87; Colonel J. Jourdan to Peck, November 25, 1863 (first quotation), and Colonel Jourdan, General Order No. 26 [December 1863] (second quotation), Part II, Letters Sent, October 1863-March 1864, District and Subdistrict of Beaufort, North Carolina, Entry 940, RG 393; John A. Hedrick to Benjamin S. Hedrick, November 29, 1863 (third quotation), and March 13, 1864 (fourth, fifth, and sixth quotations), in Browning and Smith, eds., Letters from a North Carolina Unionist, 170, 191. For an examination of standard procedures in U.S. Army occupation policy, see Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 (Washington, D.C., 1998), chap. 2.

35 Entry for November 21, 1863 (first quotation), and entry for October [n.d.], 1862 (second and third quotations), Rumley Diary, Pigott Collection. Inscoe and McKinney note that a variety of factors motivated men from western North Carolina as well to enlist in Union outfits. "[E]ven joining the Federal army—once the supreme demonstration of one's commitment to the Union cause—had become by the war's midpoint an action inspired by other feelings as well, ranging from anger or revenge to disaffection or sheer desperation. Thus, not even enlistment could be viewed as a strict measure of loyalty to the Union... " Inscoe and McKinney, Heart of Confederate Appalachia, 104.
a large number of men together.” Nine “outraged and indignant” men deserted after the Union commander moved their company from Beaufort to Washington “in flagrant disregard of solemn promises.” More locals fled the Union army after Confederates executed twenty-two captives of the Second North Carolina Union Volunteer Infantry Regiment at Kinston in February 1864. Twenty-eight men soon deserted their Federal company and made their way from the front lines near New Bern to Beaufort, where they were arrested. One officer commented that the regiment, “which at one time had some four or more companies is now reduced by desertions to about one hundred men. The regiment will never be filled and as an organization it is worse than useless.” Undoubtedly many soldiers felt they had been “fooled into [enlistment] . . . with the promises of protection.” Seeking a discharge after only three months of service, George W. Jones, a twenty-four-year-old painter whose brother had been executed at Kinston, complained that he was “looked upon as a traitor and a coward by the majority of the North as well as the South and neither feel willing to protect me.” He gloomily asserted, “I feel like a prisoner [whose] sentence is death awaiting the day of execution.” His lugubrious lament indicates that even Unionists felt betrayed by Federal actions.36

But nothing angered local white residents more than their sense that northerners were giving gracious treatment to the local African American population. Though most scholars agree that, in reality, the Federal government’s policy of emancipation did not include any real desire to provide complete independence or equality—and therefore its revolutionary nature was quite limited—the important thing to distinguish is not what was reality, but what local whites perceived at that

moment in time. White North Carolinians saw only radical policies of social equality and the dreaded fear of all white supremacists, eventual amalgamation.  

The sheer number of freedpeople who fled to Federal-controlled Beaufort and New Bern exacerbated white hostility toward blacks and their Union protectors. Beaufort, whose white and black antebellum population totaled about 1,600 (including 600 blacks), became home to nearly 2,500 blacks by January 1864 and more than 3,200 by January 1865, while New Bern housed more than 8,500 in January 1864 and nearly 11,000 a year later (compared to slightly more than 3,000 blacks in 1860). Northerners allowed these former slaves a multitude of previously forbidden freedoms. Disapproving whites helplessly witnessed blacks attend schools, confiscate white property, and be disrespectful to whites. One resident complained: “It is nothing unusual for the Negroes to curse their masters & mistresses in passing along the streets. They are allowed to do so [by the Yankees].” Additionally, Federal authorities employed blacks and paid them directly for their labor. Union officials also granted legal rights to freedpeople, an act that was appalling to the herrenvolk sensitivities of local white residents. Rumley complained, “A Negro, who in our civil courts could not be heard except through his master can appear as the accuser of any white citizen [before the provost marshal], and cause the citizen to be arrested.” To add insult to injury, northern soldiers seemed to allow blacks more privileges than whites. As John Hedrick wrote in late July 1862, “the slaves are about as free as their masters, or a little more so now because the niggs can go without passes, while the whites have to have them.” Undoubtedly, Union officials granted these freedoms because there was little doubt about the loyalty of blacks—unlike that of whites.

38 Horace James, Annual Report of the Superintendent of Negro Affairs in North Carolina, 1864. With an Appendix Containing the History and Management of Freedmen in this Department up to June 1st, 1865 (Boston, 1865), 3-6; 1860 U.S. Census, Carteret and Craven Counties, Population and Slave, NAMS M-653, reels 890, 894, and 921; Ash, When the Yankees Came, 162 (first quotation); Entry for May [n.d.], 1862 (black employment), and entry for January 1, 1863 (second quotation), Rumley Diary, Pigott Collection; John A. Hedrick to Benjamin S. Hedrick, July 29, 1862, in Browning and Smith, eds., Letters from a North Carolina Unionist, 19 (third quotation). For a fuller treatment of the African American community in the region, see my dissertation, “‘Wearing the Mask of Nationality Lightly’: The Effects of Union Military Occu-
One of the earliest incidents foreshadowing Union policy toward slaves involved Governor Stanly. When slaves came into Union lines as contrabands, Stanly, who was charged with enforcing antebellum North Carolina laws, deemed them fugitive slaves and subject to being returned to their owners. In the first test of Stanly’s authority, a local farmer named Nicholas Bray visited Stanly’s headquarters in New Bern in May 1862 and claimed that a northern soldier had taken Bray’s female slave against her will. After Bray took the oath of allegiance, Stanly granted him permission to retrieve his slave, which he did. However, northern soldiers reacted angrily against Stanly’s orders. A Union soldier readily acknowledged, “A party of our men had made [the Brays] a visit . . . held a pistol at the head of Bray and his wife—put the girl into a carriage and left—One of his houses was burned down and the fence of his own [set] on fire.” Daniel Larned corroborated the story and offered advice to the distraught Mrs. Bray: “We have promised [to] place a guard at her house, but advised her to let her slave remain where she is. I think they will soon find out that the best way is to let their slaves be where they are.” Powerless to command the army, Stanly also advised the Brays to give up their quest. Stanly’s impotence in the matter only emboldened soldiers further. One stated, “so this kidnapping game has been played out in a brief and summary manner—It will soon be attempted again—the feeling is deep and bitter among the soldiers and many of the officers.”

To native residents, such actions by northern soldiers, though contrary to formal Federal policy at that time, only portended much more ominous initiatives in regard to African Americans.\(^39\)

Indeed, when Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862, it reaffirmed white fears, particularly because North Carolina, unlike most other areas under Union occupation, was not exempted from the proclamation. North Carolina came under the power of the proclamation, and Beaufort was inundated with well-meaning Yankees from northern benevolent societies seeking to uplift the newly freed slaves. The first organization to arrive was the
American Missionary Association (AMA), whose emissaries came to North Carolina beginning in late 1862 and encouraged freedpeople to improve their social status through education.\(^{40}\)

By 1863 this new Union—embodied in the Emancipation Proclamation and the educational and uplifting aims of arriving northern benevolent societies—represented radicalism that southern whites, even many Unionists, rejected. Governor Stanly was among them. Stanly had warned Lincoln’s administration in June 1862 that unless he could give North Carolinians “some assurance that this is a war of restoration and not of abolition and destruction, no peace can be restored here for many years to come.” Stanly proved prescient. Detesting the radical turn the war had taken, Stanly resigned in protest over the Emancipation Proclamation in January 1863, ending his association with the occupation forces.\(^{41}\)

Unlike local whites who simply wanted to return to life in the Union as it had been prior to the war, some Federal officials desired a much greater change. Foremost among them was Horace James, chaplain of the Twenty-fifth Massachusetts Regiment, who became Superintendent of Negro Affairs for the Department of North Carolina in May 1863.

James asserted, “It is not enough to bring back this country to its position just before the breaking out of the rebellion. The ‘Union as it was’ is not what I want to see restored. Let us rather have it purified and perfected, coming out holier and freer from this dreadful ordeal, sanctified by the baptism of blood.” Another soldier agreed. “The more we learn of the despicable social condition of the South,” he wrote, “the stronger appears the need of the purification which, in the Providence of God, comes of the fire and the sword.”\(^{42}\)


\(^{41}\) Edward Stanly to Edwin Stanton, June 12, 1862, *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. IX, 399–402 (quotation on p. 400); Harris, *With Charity for All*, 70 (Stanly’s resignation). Stanly may have also been grateful to leave so that he would not be deemed guilty by association. On Christmas Day of 1862 in Beaufort a crowd hung him in effigy because they believed that, as governor, he was in alliance with the antislavery administration. See Brown, *Edward Stanly*, 246.

\(^{42}\) Special Orders No. 138, May 14, 1863, New Bern Occupation Papers #1993, SHC; Horace James to “My dear friends,” June 21, 1862, Horace James Correspondence, AAS (first quotation);
Despite white protests, blacks hastened Union efforts at "purification." From the moment the Union army arrived, slaves had sought control over their own bodies, minds, and material conditions. A new day had dawned for slaves, and their hopefulness and joy at future prospects became infectious. As one northern missionary noted, slaves beheld "visions of freedom and civilization opening before them," which, he admitted, "inspired my heart with an unwonted enthusiasm." Blacks' assertions of their independence often led to confrontations with local whites over the nature of what it meant to be free and occupy a place in this new civilization. Just days after the Emancipation Proclamation took effect on January 1, 1863, an African American woman sought out Joel Henry Davis, perhaps the foremost Unionist in the region and a man she knew well, to insist that her daughter be released from slavery. Beaufort's provost marshal recorded the encounter: "Mr. Davis and Mr. Rieger together tied the woman to a tree her arms over her head and then whipped her severely, the flesh on her arms where the ropes went was badly lacerated and her arms covered with blood when I saw her."43

Though he was respected as a Unionist, Davis was aggrieved about the uncompensated loss of his slaves, but being a practical merchant he recognized the benefits that accompanied allegiance to the Union forces. However, as Margaret M. Storey commented regarding Alabama Unionists, "although loyalty to the Union represented a rejection of the Confederate state, it did not necessarily represent a rejection of southern culture or values." In this case, even though he may have saluted the stars and stripes, Davis did not welcome some of the more radical U.S. war aims—embodied in the woman's demand for her daughter. If allowed to go unchecked, such black assertions could lead to attempts to achieve social equality. Davis had come to terms with Union occupation, but he would not allow a social leveling

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43 Letter from H. S. Beals, August 18, 1863, American Missionary, 7 (October 1863), 231 (first and second quotations); William B. Fowle Jr. to Major Southard Hoffman, January 14, 1863, Box 2, Part I, Letters Received, Department of North Carolina, RG 393 (third quotation). Several scholars argue that slaves were the prime movers in forcing Emancipation. See Ira Berlin et al., Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and the Civil War (Cambridge, Eng., 1992); Vincent Harding, There Is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America (New York, 1981); and Julie Saville, The Work of Reconstruction: From Slave to Wage Laborer in South Carolina, 1860-1870 (New York, 1994). James M. McPherson offers a counterargument—that Abraham Lincoln was the most instrumental force in orchestrating emancipation—in McPherson, Drawn With the Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War (New York, 1996), especially chap. 13.
between blacks and whites. Davis lashed out against the woman to demonstrate that as a white man, he still enjoyed certain powers over blacks. His reaction exemplifies Stephen V. Ash’s assertion: “To whites throughout the occupied South . . . the more violence they were able to inflict on blacks, the more thorough was their racial mastery.” But despite the physical attacks embodied in the actions of Davis, freedpeople continued to explore the opportunities afforded by emancipation.44

Local black men also sought to carve out their own identities by enlisting in colored regiments. African American enlistment practices became politicized to represent both manhood and the privileges that rightfully accompanied freedom. Northern missionaries understood the importance of enlistment to newly freed slaves: “[I]t recognizes their manhood, gives them a status in the nation, and is an open acknowledgment of their value to the country in the time of its peril.” Yet precisely such acknowledgments angered local whites. James Rumley decried that a revered Beaufort church, as well as the county courthouse, had been “prostituted to the most unholy and damnable work of raising Negro volunteers for the armed service of the Yankee government.” Union officials also employed some freedmen as sailors in the ships stationed at Beaufort. The sailors, “often fugitive slaves whose masters reside here,” engendered a mixture of outrage and fear among the citizenry for, as Rumley noted, “some of the rascals are armed.”45

A fear of armed revolt by servile blacks had long dominated white southern society and helped hold together its disparate economic and social classes. Yeomen allied with the planter class largely through this fear and their shared commitment to white supremacy. Yeomen served on slave patrols and saw their own social station enhanced by their elevation above blacks in the southern social-caste system. Viewing black soldiers and sailors walking the streets prompted Rumley to envision (even if rhetorically) the apocalyptic day when “armies of black negroes may yet be turned upon us to complete the ruin and

44 Storey, “Civil War Unionists and the Political Culture of Loyalty in Alabama,” 75; Ash, When the Yankees Came, 169.
45 “The Freedmen,” American Missionary, 7 (March 1863), 58 (first quotation); Entry dated May 30, 1863 (second quotation), and entry dated August [n.d.], 1862 (third and fourth quotations), Rumley Diary, Pigott Collection. Jim Cullen has persuasively argued that enlistment in Union regiments greatly enhanced black men’s fundamental self-perceptions: “As the material conditions of their lives changed—as they joined the armed forces, were freed from slavery, or both—so too did their ideological conceptions of themselves as men.” See Jim Cullen, “’I’s a Man Now’: Gender and African American Men,” in Catherine Clinton and Nina Silber, eds., Divided Houses: Gender and the Civil War (New York, 1992), 77.
desolation that Yankee vandalism has begun." Even John Hedrick, the antislavery Unionist, admitted that he "would much rather see a hundred negroes sent from than one into the State." Old antebellum fears of slave insurrections, fueled by memories of Santo Domingo, Nat Turner, and John Brown, created such an intense Negrophobia that by May 1863, Hedrick noted that most Beaufort whites "wish to get rid of slavery and negroes, and if they can not dispose of the latter any other way, they wish to kill them." Whites felt the traditional social order had been inverted by the Union occupation, which Rumley scathingly induted as "a reign of niggerism."^46

The frequent interactions between freedpeople and Union soldiers, who Rumley believed actually preferred blacks to whites, exacerbated white resentment. Although Federal troops did have open, sometimes intimate relations with blacks, the vast majority of northern soldiers in the area, including the antislavery ones from New England, maintained decidedly racist views. Simultaneously, however, many northern officials did hold African Americans in higher regard than poor whites. Horace James concluded, "of those who are equally poor and equally destitute, the white person will be the one to sit down in forlorn and languid helplessness, and eat the bread of charity, while the negro will be tinkering at something, in his rude way, to hammer out a living."^47

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^47 There is an extensive literature on northern white soldiers' reactions to black civilians and soldiers. For just a sample, see Joseph T. Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman's Troops in the Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns (New York, 1985) and Jacqueline Glass Campbell, When Sherman Marched North from the Sea: Resistance on the Confederate Home Front (Chapel Hill, 2003). For an examination of the cultural baggage regarding race that New England soldiers brought to war, see David A. Cecere, "Carrying the Home Front to War: Soldiers, Race, and New England Culture during the Civil War," in Paul A. Cimbala and Randall M. Miller, eds., Union Soldiers and the Northern Home Front: Wartime Experiences, Postwar Adjustments (New York, 2002), 293–323. For a fuller treatment of Union soldiers' racism in this region, see Browning, "Wearing the Mask of Nationality Lightly," chap. 5.
Union authorities showed a preference for employing industrious freedpeople over poor whites, perhaps because officials deemed poor whites to be inferior to blacks "in intelligence, energy, and every thing else that makes up a noble character." One Massachusetts soldier voiced a sentiment shared by many northerners: "the poor whites of the south are lower than the blacks." Poor whites discerned this condescension from their occupiers and perceived the attitude as an insult to their honor. They had fled to Union lines expecting opportunities for economic and perhaps social advancement. However, when it became apparent that some white northerners held them in lower esteem than blacks, poor whites reacted angrily and sometimes violently. In retaliation, a few took covert action against their occupiers. "There are a set of poor whites around here," wrote a Massachusetts soldier, "who are Union-looking citizens in the day time and 'guerrillas' at night, who raise hogs and sweet potatoes by day and in the night shoot our pickets."^48

Poor whites also publicly rejected the northern benevolent societies' efforts at improvement. When northern missionaries opened schools, freedpeople flocked to them, but very few poor whites attended, even though they were invited. In 1864 poor whites caused a panic in a black church by threatening to blow it up with the congregation inside. Three white men torched one of the freedpeople's schoolhouses and threatened the female teacher with violence unless she promised to "never again teach 'niggers' to read." Of course, white fears of educating slaves were endemic throughout the occupied South. As Don H. Doyle asserts in reference to occupied Mississippi during and after the war, "The objection stemmed from apprehension that northern missionaries and Republican sympathizers were going to be teaching the freedmen more than reading, writing, and arithmetic." Ultimately, whites feared their occupiers were going to convert blacks into Radical Republicans, who could potentially undermine conservative white power.^49


^49 Entry dated November 28, 1864, Cleveland Diary (panic at black church); Sing-Nan Fen, "Notes on the Education of Negroes in North Carolina During the Civil War," Journal of Negro
By the spring of 1865, Carteret residents were increasingly recalcitrant under Union occupation. Federal officials distrusted the strength and depth of white loyalty, not only in Carteret but also throughout the state. As one northern observer commented at the end of the war, "The North-Carolinian calls himself a Unionist, but he makes no special pretence of love for the Union. He desires many favors, but he asks them generally on the ground that he hated the Secessionists. He expects the nation to recognize rare virtue in that hatred, and hopes it may win for his State the restoration of her political rights; but he wears his mask of nationality so lightly that there is no difficulty in removing it." Indeed, many in the Carteret region removed their masks eagerly. With the destruction of their property, the use of heavy-handed tactics, and, most trenchantly, the empowerment of their former slaves, the humiliation of local whites was complete. As a result, they redefined their community as one based on their view of the Union before the war, not the radical new Union the Federal government had thrust upon them. As Whitelaw Reid, a northern journalist who traveled through the South in the immediate wake of the war, observed, southern whites were Union men only "if they can have the Union their way—if the negroes can be kept under, and themselves put foremost." In Carteret, a man's actions during the war would serve as a litmus test for his postwar success. Those who stood by the Union often found themselves ostracized from the community. As one Union officer explained later, "It cost something to be loyal to the Union . . . ."50

This denouement can be traced in the postwar fate of the Carteret merchants. Benjamin A. Ensley had skillfully navigated the shoals of Unionism in Beaufort, only to find himself shipwrecked on a newly Confederate shore. Although he initially avoided taking the oath of

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50 Sidney Andrews, The South Since the War, As Shown by Fourteen Weeks of Travel and Observation in Georgia and the Carolinas (1866; reprint, Boston, 1971), 392 (first quotation); Whitelaw Reid quoted in Roberta Sue Alexander, North Carolina Faces the Freedmen: Race Relations during Presidential Reconstruction, 1865–67 (Durham, 1985), 34 (second quotation); J. Waldo Denny, Wearing the Blue in the Twenty-Fifth Mass. Volunteer Infantry . . . (Worcester, 1879), 227 (third quotation). Those men who served in the North Carolina Union Regiments faced even greater hostility. As one Union officer pleaded to Federal authorities after the war, "Surely the government will not now send them to their home defenseless, leaving them to the mercy of those from whom both themselves & families have suffered taunts, & violence during the rebellion." For local whites who detested the occupation, "the humiliation of defeat & subjugation can never eradicate unprincipled hatred from their bosom nor prevent secret plots of midnight violence & highway murders." Oscar Eastmond to J. A. Campbell, June 10, 1865, First N.C. Infantry Regimental Letter and Endorsement Book, RG 94. See also Browning, "'Little Souled Mercenaries'?" 362–63.
allegiance, Ensley finally relented in order to continue to manage his store in Beaufort, and he negotiated regularly with Union officials. By July 1867, "very badly broke in fortune," he moved to Hyde County to try to carve out an existence in a more strongly Unionist enclave. Encumbered by large debts before the war, George Taylor, proprietor of the Ocean House, was barely making ends meet. The war solved his immediate financial woes when his establishment became the hub of Union activity, garnering him sizable profits. In December 1865 the boost from Federal contracts had righted him, and he was "worth 10 or 15 thousand [dollars] . . . [and] doing good business." Yet local whites had a long memory, and their rejection of his wartime choices propelled him back into debt. By May 1868, he was out of business.51

Joel Henry Davis, who had taken a prominent role as a Unionist in the community, ran a successful dry goods store. After the war he formed a partnership with his son and Henry Rieger, the man who had helped him whip his freed slave, and their business was "moderately successful." But Davis's defense of white honor was not enough to remove the stain of Unionism from his family. By June 1871 the partnership's store had "been burnt out & not resumed business." David W. Morton had been the first to greet Union troops entering Morehead and had even convinced a nephew to desert the Confederate army. Local whites never forgave him. When Morton's nephew was asked by a postwar commission if he knew "if Mr. D. W. Morton was ever persecuted for his Union sentiments," he replied, "I think he sold out and went away from here on that account."52

Conversely, those who steadfastly maintained their Confederate allegiance during the war found postwar Beaufort to be a friendly place. Stephen Decatur Pool had led the efforts to organize a Confederate company as much to salvage his honor as for patriotic reasons. However, once he embraced the Confederate cause as his own, Pool never looked back. He distinguished himself under fire during the siege of

51 E. A. Harkness to Southard Hoffman, March 5, 1863, Box 2, Part I, Letters Received, Department of North Carolina, Ser. 3238, RG 393 (Ensley refuses oath); B. A. Ensley to J. Jourdan, January 28, 1864, Part II, Letters Sent, October 1863–March 1864, District and Subdistrict of Beaufort, Entry 940, RG 393 (negotiations); North Carolina, Vol. 5, p. 176-E (first quotation) and p. 176-A (second quotation and Taylor out of business), R. G. Dun & Co. Collection.

52 John A. Hedrick to Benjamin S. Hedrick, September 8, 1862, in Browning and Smith, eds., Letters from a North Carolina Unionist, 34 (Davis as Unionist); New Bern Weekly Progress, September 20, 1862 (Davis as Unionist); North Carolina, Vol. 5, p. 176-L, R. G. Dun & Co. Collection (first and second quotations); Deposition of Lewis McCain (greeting Union soldiers), Deposition of J. T. Dennis (desertion), and Deposition of Josiah L. Bell (third and fourth quotations), in David W. Morton v. United States (case file no. 6935), RG 123.
Fort Macon in 1862, brazenly taunted Union officers outside New Bern in 1863, and edited a “rebels’” newspaper in postwar New Bern. James Rumley, the secessionist diarist, returned to his old post as clerk of the Carteret County Court without complication, as residents knew his true sentiments even though he had begrudgingly dealt with the Union authorities. But perhaps the most remarkable example of wartime actions influencing postwar success is that of Rufus W. Bell. Bell had been arrested in February 1865 for helping a female spy carry contraband goods through the lines to Confederate soldiers; he had led groups of men on clandestine raids against Union forces; and he had once told a New Jersey soldier “that he would rather have his right hand cut off than take the oath of allegiance.” Local whites rewarded his defiance. Bell, who had never been a merchant before, opened a store in December 1865 and gained a level of success that no prominent Unionist attained.53

Ironically, Carteret County residents were more firmly sympathetic with the Confederacy, or at least the ideals it represented, at the war’s end than they had ever been during the heady days of secession.54 Only conditional Confederates in 1861, they became confirmed Confederates during the very Union occupation that was supposed to cultivate and encourage loyal feelings among the inhabitants. Instead of serving as a model of how benevolent Union occupation could foster harmony in the South, Carteret County became one of the regions most hostile to the Federal government during Reconstruction in North Carolina. This community case study exposes the degree to which the sentiments of southern Unionists were altered by freedpeople asserting

53 Papers of James Monroe Hollowell, April 25, 1862, in Janet B. Hewett et al., eds., Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (100 vols.; Wilmington, N.C., 1994–2001), Pt. 1, Vol. I, 602–4 (Pool at Fort Macon); Tom Stevenson to Hannah, October 9, 1862, Walcott Family Papers II, MHS (taunting Union officers); Daniel R. Goodloe to B. S. Hedrick, April 24, 1867, Benjamin Sherwood Hedrick Papers (Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C.) (editing newspaper); Testimony of James Rumley, Claim 15562 (Benjamin Roberson), Carteret County, RG 223 (Rumley as clerk); Entry dated February 9, 1865, Cleveland Diary (Bell arrested); “Statement of Amanda Gaskill, Thos. Rudderforth & B. F. Bloodgood in relation to force on Adams Creek,” October 21, 1862, Box 1, Part I, Letters Received, Department of North Carolina, Ser. 3238, RG 393 (clandestine raids and quotation); North Carolina, Vol. 5, p. 164, R. G. Dun & Co. Collection (success as merchant).

54 Margaret M. Storey has recently argued that the Unionist experience on the Confederate home front—under Confederate occupation, one might say—led them to hold an increasingly radicalized view of the war and politics and “brought Unionists to the point of endorsing some of the most radical of the Republican approaches to Reconstruction.” However, in this article and the dissertation from which it stems, I find the opposite holds true for Unionists and Confederates under Union occupation. See Storey, “Civil War Unionists and the Political Culture of Loyalty in Alabama,” 83n24. See also Browning, “Wearing the Mask of Nationality Lightly,” chap. 6.
their rights and being supported by Federal authorities. The actions of Carteret residents during occupation revealed that white superiority was much more important than economic stability and presaged the contentious Reconstruction years to follow. That those who could most demonstrably prove their Confederate proclivities were the most successful in the immediate postwar years indicates the limited role the Federal government was able to play in constructing a successful Republican interracial coalition. By fomenting violence, local whites, angry from perceived betrayals during wartime occupation, refused to allow such a coalition to sustain itself during Reconstruction. The recalcitrance of white southerners suggested to Federal officials that perhaps the only way the Union could prevent dissent and open revolt was to allow southern whites to dictate racial policy. This was a hard lesson, but one the North eventually learned by 1877, when it cast aside Reconstruction and in turn abandoned African Americans throughout the South to disfranchisement, lynching, segregation, and Jim Crow.55

The Carteret County experience not only enlightens the understanding of Reconstruction but also extends beyond the Civil War. As this community study suggests, even the noblest intentions of an occupying force (or liberating force, depending on one’s point of view) can create hostility and resentment on the ground. As the American government discovered during the Civil War—and has often rediscovered in the years since—people under military rule have a peculiar habit of deciding for themselves what they believe is in their own best interests, and they often resent an outside entity that tries to impose significant social and cultural transformations on their society.
